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Abstract 
 
Mismatches between workers’ skills and job demands have large negative effects on productivity, job 
satisfaction, and other outcomes. Current approaches to measure the impact of skills and skill mismatches 
on wages fail to specify the mechanism through which skills and mismatches may affect productivity. In 
this paper, we develop a new perspective by integrating skill proficiency and skill use into a new concept 
called skill effort. Skill effort is defined as a multiplicative function of skill proficiency and skill use. The 
intuitive understanding of this concept is that a skill can have no effect on productivity if it is not used and, 
vice versa, use of a skill is moderated by the skill proficiency level. The new concept is firmly rooted in 
use-it-or-lose-it, engagement, and self-efficacy theories and has a parallel in previous theories on 
performance. The theoretical breakthrough is that the concept of skill effort explicitly specifies the 
mechanism through which skills affect wages. Standard wage models (whether based on educational or 
skill variables) do not explicitly take this mechanism into account. In the skill effort model, skills can only 
affect wages if they are put to productive use. In the paper we show that this is indeed the case: there is no 
effect of proficiency level on wages, other than through the use of these skills. 
 
In the paper we use this concept to develop a skill matching model using data on numeracy proficiency 
from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies. We apply a realized matches 
approach to turn the skill effort model into three components: the effect of required skill effort, the effect of 
overperformance and the effect of underperformance. This model explains 29% of the variance in wages, 
which is much higher than the 23% found in alternative skill mismatch models. Moreover it not much 
lower than a standard educational mismatch model that explains 31% of the variance in wages. As 
education imparts more skills than just numeracy, this is in fact an indication that the developed skill 
mismatch model is very good. We discuss remaining issues on the measurement of this concept and present 
different ways to address them. 
 
Keywords: Skill proficiency, skill use, mismatch, wages 
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1. Introduction
2
 
 
Starting with the seminal work of Becker (1964), researchers have looked at the relation between schooling 
and productivity, typically using Mincerian wage regressions to assess the effect of schooling and 
experience on wages (Mincer, 1974). In these equations, schooling and experience are used as proxies for 
skills and wages as a proxy for productivity. These models are primarily supply driven and assume that 
individual productivity is a function of individual skills. With the large increase in higher education 
enrollment and the subsequent debate on overeducation, this human capital interpretation of the relation 
between schooling and productivity has been seriously challenged (Thurow, 1975; Freeman, 1976), leading 
to stronger emphasis on job characteristics determining productivity and focusing on the potential negative 
effects of overeducation (Bills, 2003). Several models and methods have been developed and tested (van 
der Velden and van Smoorenburg, 1997; Battu, Belfield, and Sloane, 2000; Hartog, 2000; Verhaest and 
Omey, 2006) and the general conclusion from the empirical evidence is that the effects of educational 
mismatches are best explained by matching models that assume that the combination of supply and demand 
determines productivity (Sattinger, 1993, 2012; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000; Hartog, 2000; 
McGuiness, 2006). That is, productivity is highest when workers’ educational level is a good match to the 
level required for their job. When workers’ educational level is higher than the level required on the job, 
these workers still have a productivity benefit but not fully, since the utilization of their additional 
schooling in their work is restricted by job characteristics. Conversely, workers who lack some of the 
schooling required in their job will not reach the same productivity level as their co-workers with a 
matching educational level. 
 
Although the empirical results of educational mismatches are quite consistent over time and across 
countries, to simply interpret these as skill mismatches has proven difficult (Halaby, 1994; Allen and van 
der Velden, 2001; Green and McIntosh, 2007; Quintini, 2011). This has been partly due to a lack of 
adequate measures of individual skills. The newly developed Programme for the International Assessment 
of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) has provided a first opportunity to look at educational mismatches and skills at the same time 
(Levels, van der Velden, and Allen, 2014).  
 
Still, there are two major issues. One is that the standard wage model does not directly specify how skills 
can affect the productivity. In fact, the process through which skills affect productivity is treated as a black 
box. The second problem is that having information on skills possessed is not enough. To measure the 
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(September 3–5, 2015, Brno), the Sixth Workshop on Economics of Education (September 9–10, 2015, Barcelona), the 
12th IHW/IAB Workshop on Labour Market Policies (October 12–13, 2015, Halle), the Second International PIAAC 
Conference (November 22–24, 2016, Haarlem), the DUHR seminar (January 26, 2016, Maastricht), the ROA Human 
Capital over the Life Cycle conference (February 19–20, 2016, Maastricht), and the OCW Kennislunch (March 3, 2016, 
The Hague) for useful comments and suggestions. 
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effects of skill mismatches, we also need information on the skill requirements. The problem is that no 
large data set exists that contains direct information on these skill requirements. Instead, three approaches 
have been developed to proxy for skill requirements: 1) worker self-assessment (WS; asking the worker 
about the required level, e.g., by asking, “How important are the following skills for doing your current 
job?”), 2) realized matches (RM; taking the average or median skill level in an occupation as the required 
skill level), and 3) the job requirement approach (JRA; taking the use of skills in a job as a proxy for the 
required skill level). All of these approaches have their own weaknesses, both theoretically and empirically. 
 
We develop a new perspective by integrating skill proficiency and skill use into a new concept called skill 
effort. Skill effort is defined as a multiplicative function of skill proficiency and skill use. The intuitive 
understanding of this concept is that a skill can have no effect on productivity if it is not used and, vice 
versa, use of a skill is moderated by the skill proficiency level. The new concept is firmly rooted in use-it-
or-lose-it, engagement, and self-efficacy theories and has a parallel in previous theories on performance. 
The theoretical breakthrough is that the concept of skill effort explicitly specifies the mechanism through 
which skills affect wages: Skills can only affect wages if they are put to productive use. In the paper we 
show that this is indeed the case: there is no effect of proficiency level on wages, other than through the use 
of these skills. 
 
We apply this concept to develop a matching model based on RM using PIAAC data. We illustrate this for 
numeracy and perform robustness analyses using literacy. The model for numeracy explains 29% of the 
variance in wages, which is much higher than the 23% found in alternative skill mismatch models. 
Moreover it not much lower than a standard educational mismatch model that explains 31% of the variance 
in wages. As education imparts more skills than just numeracy, this is in fact an indication that the 
developed skill mismatch model is very good. We discuss remaining issues on the measurement of this 
concept and present different ways to address them. 
 
 
2. Earlier approaches to measure skill mismatches 
 
As indicated above, one problem in skill mismatch models is that direct information on the skill 
requirements on the job is lacking. Three approaches have been developed to construct a proxy of these 
skill requirements: WS, RM, and the JRA. 
 
The WS approach typically asks the worker directly about the required level. The European Centre for the 
Development of Vocational Training European Union Skills Survey,
3
 for example, asks the question, “On a 
scale from 0 to 10, how important are the following skills for doing your current job?,” followed by a list of 
                                               
3 See http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/publications/8088.  
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skills. Similar approaches are used in many surveys among graduates (e.g., the REFLEX survey; see Allen 
and van der Velden, 2011). One of the major problems with this approach is that the answer scales lack an 
objective anchor (Allen and van der Velden, 2005) and are prone to social bias (“talking up one’s job”). 
The anchoring problem has been addressed in several surveys by introducing clear anchors in the scale 
(e.g., the O*NET survey
4
) or by using vignettes (King, Murray, Salomon, and Tandon, 2004; King and 
Wand, 2004). In addition, the social bias problem has been addressed by focusing on activities and using 
time intensity or frequency scales instead of importance or skill level, as in the JRA—for example, in the 
British Skills Survey (Green, Felstead, and Gallie, 2013) or the PIAAC survey (OECD, 2013a, 2013b). 
Still, neither problem has been completely solved (see later on the JRA). 
 
A different version of the WS asks workers to indicate a skill mismatch directly. The European Working 
Conditions Survey,
5
 for example, asks workers, “Which of the following alternatives would best describe 
your skills in your own work?,” with answers 1) “I need further training to cope well with my duties,” 2) 
“My present skills correspond well with my duties,” and 3) “I have the skills to cope with more demanding 
duties.” The problem with this approach is, again, that it is prone to social bias (people may overestimate 
their own skill level). Apart from that, there is no separate estimate of the required skill level. This is all the 
more serious, because we know that part of the educational mismatches are just apparent and do not reflect 
a skill mismatch at all (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; Green and McIntosh, 2007; Quintini, 2011). This 
is because the lower skilled of a certain educational level are sorted into jobs that are less complex. These 
people may be formally “overeducated” for these jobs but, in fact, these jobs match their skills quite well. 
Levels et al. (2014) found evidence that this is indeed the case, especially in countries with low labor 
market regulation. 
 
The second approach to assess skill requirements and skill mismatches is the RM approach. This approach 
takes the average or median skill level in an occupation as the required skill level and defines a worker as 
overskilled or underskilled if the worker has a skill proficiency level of—usually—one or one and a half 
standard deviations above or below that occupation-specific level. For example, Perry, Wiederhold, and 
Ackermann-Piek (2014) used PIAAC data to assess the average skill level of each International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) two-digit occupation category in Austria, Germany, and the United 
States (leaving out those occupations with fewer than 30 observations). A more complex model was 
applied by Pellizari and Fichen (2013), also using PIAAC data. They used a sort of combination of the WS 
and RM approaches. First, they selected all workers who identified themselves as being well matched. For 
this, the authors used two questions from the PIAAC background questionnaire: “Do you feel that you have 
the skills to cope with more demanding duties than those you are required to perform in your current job?” 
and “Do you feel that you need further training in order to cope well with your present duties?” Only 
                                               
4 See https://www.onetcenter.org/questionnaires.html#generic.  
5 See http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2012/working-conditions/fifth-european-working-conditions-
survey-overview-report.  
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respondents who answered no to both questions (only approximately 20% of the workers) were considered 
well matched subjectively. The authors then assessed the range of skill proficiency levels of all the workers 
who identified themselves as well matched per country per one-digit ISCO occupation category. This range 
was then trimmed (omitting the lower and upper 5%) and regarded as the “normal” skill range in that one-
digit occupation category. Any worker – regardless of what he or she answered to the two subjective 
questions - is considered well matched if their skill proficiency levels fell in the country-occupation 
specific skill ranges. Anyone with a skill proficiency level above the 95% score was defined as overskilled 
and anyone below the 5% range was defined as underskilled. Based on this model, 86% were defined as 
well matched, 10% were defined as overskilled, and only 3% were defined as underskilled in both the 
numeracy and literacy domains (Pellizari and Fichen, 2013). 
 
One theoretical problem with the RM approach (not only here but also in the case of educational 
mismatches; see Battu et al., 2000; Hartog, 2000; Verhaest and Omey, 2006) is that the definition of well 
matched is always relative. Basically, the approach defines workers with an average or median skill 
proficiency level in a certain occupation as well matched. However, since there is no objective criterion 
that defines the actual required skill level, all of these workers may, in fact, be overskilled or underskilled. 
Assuming that the majority of workers will have a job that in fact matches their skills may not be a wild 
guess generally, but the RM approach typically ignores differences in skill mismatches across countries or 
across occupations (due to standardization per country and per occupation). 
 
In addition, there is a statistical problem. Occupational categories are heterogeneous and contain 
occupations that could differ in required skill levels. This, of course, tends to hold more at the aggregated 
level of one-digit ISCO occupation categories than at the more disaggregated four-digit levels. The basic 
issue here is that workers in a one-digit ISCO occupation category could be wrongfully classified as 
matched or mismatched, although the required skill level at a more detailed level would suggest differently. 
The problem is that, in surveys such as PIAAC, sufficient observations are not usually available for 
assessing the average skill level at, for example, the three- or four-digit ISCO level in each country. Even 
the two-digit ISCO level is often not possible due to the small number of observations. This was one of the 
reasons why Pellizari and Fichen (2013) resorted to using skill proficiency levels at the one-digit ISCO 
level per country. However, these categories are far too heterogeneous to allow for a correct determination 
of whether a worker is well matched, overskilled, or underskilled. 
 
The third approach, the JRA, was developed by Green et al. (2013) for the British Skills Survey and was 
also applied in the PIAAC survey. Instead of asking about the importance of a certain skill in a job, this 
approach asks about its time intensity or frequency of use. A typical question would be, “In your job, how 
often do you usually read letters, memos, or e-mails?” with answers ranging from never to every day 
(PIAAC; OECD, 2013b). A set of items relating to a certain skill domain, for example, literacy, and 
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reflecting different complexity levels is then used to construct a scale on skill use. The interpretation of this 
scale is that it reflects the skill requirements on the job (hence the term job requirement approach). The 
assumption is that a high level of skill use reflects a higher level of required skills. Allen, Levels, and van 
der Velden (2013) have used this to construct a measure of skill mismatch that they call relative use of skill. 
Using PIAAC data, they standardized both measures of skill use and proficiency for a domain and then 
subtracted them. Workers with a skill use level one and a half standard deviations higher than what would 
have been predicted on the basis of their skill proficiency were classified as overusing their skills and 
workers with a level of skill use one and a half standard deviations lower than what would have been 
predicted on the basis of their skill proficiency level were classified as underusing their skills. In a strict 
sense, this concept of over- and underutilization only takes the perspective of the worker. Quite literally, 
overutilization from the worker’s perspective implies that the person is using his or her skills more than the 
person’s proficiency level would allow. That differs from a perspective in which the job is the reference: In 
this latter case, overutilization means that the job requirements are higher than the level a worker possesses. 
 
A theoretical problem with the JRA is that the use of skills is not necessarily a good proxy for skill 
requirements. Moreover, the two concepts used to construct the mismatch variable, skill use and skill 
proficiency, are, in practice, closely linked, both empirically and theoretically. This makes it difficult to 
regard skill use an independent measure of skill requirement, since it also reflects skill proficiency. There is 
also a measurement problem in the JRA, as has been highlighted by Pellizari and Fichen (2013). Both 
constructs are measured on different scales. Standardizing both constructs actually disguises the fact that 
the two scales are fundamentally different. In that sense, the JRA suffers from the same problem of the 
definition of a good match as the RM approach: Both consider workers that have average skills compared 
to either the average use or the average in their occupation as being well matched, but that is not 
necessarily true. 
 
 
3. Toward a new theoretical model 
 
The assumption in the JRA that skill use and skill proficiency are different forces us to rethink both 
concepts. Can skill use be seen as a proxy for skill requirements or is it so closely related to skill 
proficiency that it is hard to disentangle the two? There are at least three strands of literature that suggest 
the latter: the use-it-or-lose-it theory, self-efficacy theory, and engagement theories. 
 
The use-it-or-lose-it-theory (Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Bynner and Parsons, 1998; Krahn and Lowe, 1998; 
Salthouse, 2006; Desjardins and Warnke, 2012) argues that skills that are not being used depreciate over 
the life cycle. For example, Bynner and Parsons (1998) show that time out of paid employment is 
detrimental to numeracy skills. This result was less evident when looking at literacy skills. This is 
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interpreted by the authors to mean that reading skills are more related to everyday life and so are still used 
upon employment cessation, whereas numeracy skills are much more related to work and are much less 
used in everyday life. Levels and van der Velden (forthcoming) used PIAAC data to document the factors 
that affect the acquisition and decline of skills over the life cycle. They concluded that the use of skills is 
strongly related to hampering or accelerating skill proficiency, although the causal direction is not quite 
clear. People may lose skills because they do not use them anymore or they may have stopped using them 
because they lost them. 
 
Whatever the causal direction, self-efficacy and engagement theories suggest that the two concepts are 
closely interlinked. Self-efficacy theory, developed by Bandura (1977), states that task-related self-efficacy 
increases the likelihood of being engaged in a more challenging task, thus increasing the skill level and 
self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is one of the motivational variables that has been studied as one of the driving 
factors of engagement, which is a result of cognitive factors, motivational factors, as well as a positive 
attitude to use certain skills (Guthrie and Wigfield, 2000). In the conceptual foundation of skills surveys 
such as PIAAC, reading engagement and numeracy engagement are considered driving factors in the 
acquisition of these key skills (OECD, 2012a). Self-efficacy has been shown to be a good predictor of a 
range of academic outcomes (Multon, Brown, and Lent, 1991). Reading engagement and numeracy 
engagement have been shown to be closely linked to skill proficiency levels (OECD, 2012a). 
 
If the concepts of skill use and skill proficiency are so closely linked, we need to rethink their relation to 
productivity. Are skill use and skill proficiency two sides of the same coin or are they different? Can they 
be seen as supplementary or as complementary? One of the driving questions challenging the human capital 
interpretation of the relation between skills and wages is why would employers pay for skills that are not 
required? We can pose a similar question for skill use: Why would employers pay for skills that are not 
used? All of the previous empirical work on the relation between skills and wages implicitly assumes that 
the wage premium for skills is related to using those skills on the job. If that is not the case, we would be 
back to a pure signaling or credential type of explanation (Spence, 1973; Collins, 1979), where employers 
are assumed to pay for schooling or skills that are not actually required on the job. Most of the empirical 
evidence, however, suggests that this is not the case (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011; Hanushek, 
Schwerdt, Wiederhold, and Woessmann, 2014) 
 
We believe that we need to develop a concept that firmly integrates skill proficiency and skill use into one 
new concept: skill effort. More specifically, we assume that productivity is a multiplicative function of two 
inputs: skills and effort. The intuitive understanding of this assumption is straightforward. Skills can affect 
productivity but only when they are put to use.
6
 There is no reward for skills that are not being used. This is 
                                               
6 One can think of certain skills for which this relation is less straightforward. For example, a pilot needs to be very 
proficient in dealing with emergency situations and will also be rewarded for that type of skill, although it is not necessary 
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in line with a basic human capital framework, assuming that there can only be a reward for skills that are 
actually used. Conversely, the effect of using a particular skill is moderated by the skill proficiency level. If 
the proficiency level is low, using that skill has less effect on productivity than when the proficiency level 
is high. The idea of regarding productivity as a multiplicative function of two inputs is not new. In the early 
1960s, the psychologist Vroom (1964) developed expectancy theory in his study on the motivations for 
decision making. According to his theory, performance is a multiplicative function of ability and 
motivation. This theory has been applied and tested in different settings, mainly in education and in work. 
A recent review by van Iddekinge, Aguinis, and Mackey (2014) shows that the empirical research has 
provided mixed evidence, except in the case of job performance, where the results seem to support this 
theory. 
 
We now express this as a formal model. Let us define the following: 
Pi = productivity level of individual i 
Wi = wage level of individual i 
Si = skill proficiency of individual i 
Ui = skill use of individual i 
SEi = skill effort of individual i 
υi = idiosyncratic error term 
 
Then, 
Pi = Wi = α + βSi * Ui + υi 
 = α + βSEi + υi         (1) 
 
To assess the effect of skill mismatches, we need to turn this equation into a standard matching model. We 
follow the conventional so-called overeducation–required education–undereducation model (ORU) 
developed by Duncan and Hoffman (1981). In this model, own schooling level (OS) is broken down into its 
three components: 
 Years of required education (RE) 
 Years of overeducation (OE), defined as OS - RE if OS > RE and zero otherwise  
 Years of undereducation (UE) defined as RE - OS if OS < RE and zero otherwise 
 
This means that OS = RE + OE – UE and the standard wage regression is 
 
Wi = α + β1*REi + β2*OEi + β3*UEi + υ1       (2) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
that this skill be used often. This model therefore pertains to skills whose use is assumed to be central for functioning in a 
job. This is true for all key skills, such as numeracy, literacy, problem solving, and social skills.  
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In other words, the ORU model assumes a wage premium for required years of schooling (β1), a wage 
premium for years of overeducation (β2), and a wage penalty for years of undereducation (β3). Empirical 
findings around the world usually show that β1 > β2 > lβ3l (Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000; 
Hartog, 2000; Levels et al., 2014). 
 
We can develop a similar model for skill mismatches. We assume that each occupation has a typically 
required level of skill effort. Workers can perform above or below these standards and will receive a wage 
premium/penalty accordingly. However, in line with the matching theories and the empirical results from 
educational mismatch research, there are decreasing returns/penalties to performing above or below the 
standard. 
 
Let us assume that both Si and Ui are both standardized variables with a mean of 10 and a standard 
deviation of one.
7
 Now let 
 
RSEi = mean SEij = typically required skill effort of individual i in occupation j 
OSEi = (SEi - RSEi) for (SEi – RSEi) > 0.5, else 0 = extent to which individual i has a higher skill effort (at 
least 0.5 standard deviations higher) than typically required in occupation j 
USEi = (RSEi - SEi) for (RSEi - SEi) > 0.5, else 0 = extent to which individual i has a lower skill effort (at 
least 0.5 standard deviations lower) than typically required in occupation j 
 
Now eq. (1) can be written as 
 
Wi = α + β1*RSEi + β2*OSEi + β3*USEi + υ1       (3) 
 
As in previous research, we expect the returns to required skill effort to be higher than the returns to 
overperformance in skill effort and these, in turn, to be higher (in absolute terms) than the returns to 
underperformance in skill effort. 
 
 
4. Data and method 
 
We use the PIAAC data set (OECD, 2013b) that assesses the proficiency of the adult population in key 
information-processing skills in OECD countries. The survey is designed to be cross-culturally and cross-
nationally valid. The original data set comprised 24 countries and approximately 166,000 respondents. The 
national samples are representative samples of non-institutionalized persons aged 16 to 65 years. Most 
                                               
7 A mean of 10 is used to avoid negative and zero values. The results are not sensitive to which positive value is used, as 
long as it is large enough so that negative or zero values are avoided.  
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countries have around 5,000 respondents in the sample, with the exception of Canada, which has more than 
27,000 respondents. From this data set, we excluded Australia, because of data protection rules, and the 
Russian Federation, because we were not sure about the data quality. From the Canadian sample, we took a 
random sample of about 20% to avoid overrepresentation of the Canadian sample in the total data set. 
 
The PIAAC survey comprises a combination of computer-based assessment and—for those who are not 
able or willing to take the computer-based test—paper and pencil data collection strategies to assess the 
proficiency of respondents in three key information-processing skills: numeracy, literacy, and problem 
solving in technology-rich environments. We only focus on numeracy and check the comparability of the 
results for literacy. The reason for omitting problem solving is that around one-third of the respondents did 
not take the test because they lacked computer skills or chose to only use paper and pencil tests (which 
were not available for the problem solving domain). Moreover, some countries (Cyprus, France, Italy, and 
Spain) decided not to offer this test. Adaptive testing and item response techniques were used to calculate 
10 plausible values (PVs) for each of these two domains. Together, these PVs for numeracy and literacy 
provide an unbiased estimate of the “real” score if the respondent would have taken all the numeracy- and 
literacy-related items (OECD, 2013b). The numeracy scale has a range from zero to 500, with an OECD 
international average of 273 and the literacy scale has a similar range, with an OECD average of 270. 
 
The respondents were further interviewed on non-cognitive skills, key demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, as well as the extent to which they use key information-processing skills in the workplace or 
at home. For this paper, the key variables of interest are numeracy and literacy proficiency, as well as the 
use of these skills at work. The background questionnaire contained a number of questions related to the 
use of numeracy and literacy skills at work. We constructed two scales based on items that reflect the use 
of numeracy and literacy skills at work: six items on the use of numeracy skills at work (e.g., “In your job, 
how often do you usually a) calculate prices, costs, or budgets, b) use or calculate fractions, decimals, or 
percentages”) and eight items on the use of reading skills8 at work (e.g., “In your job, how often do you 
usually a) read directions or instructions, b) read letters, memos, or e-mails”). We computed simple average 
scores for these sets of items. The Cronbach alphas for these two scales are 0.803 and 0.806, respectively. 
 
To estimate the average skill proficiency and skill use levels for each two-digit ISCO occupation category 
in the different countries, we use the calculations of Allen and Bijlsma (2015), who developed occupational 
profiles for each country (see Appendix A for details). This means that we have a country-specific estimate 
for the average skill proficiency level and the average level of skill use for all two-digit ISCO occupation 
categories in each of the two domains for all countries. At the individual level, we also use the scores for 
                                               
8 The PIAAC questionnaire also has four items related to writing skills (e.g., “In your job, how often do you usually a) write 
letters, memos, or e-mails, b) write articles for newspapers, magazines, or newsletters”). Conceptually the reading items 
are closer to the domain of literacy, which is about understanding written information, which is why we decided not to use 
the writing items.  
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each of these four variables. For the proficiency scores, we use the average of the PVs for each domain.
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We now standardize these variables for each country separately with a mean of 10 and a standard deviation 
of one. The mean of 10 was chosen to avoid negative and zero values (see footnote 7). The skill effort 
measure and skill mismatch are then calculated using eqs. (1) and (3). 
 
Next we selected male full-time working employees. This selection was made to avoid different wage-
setting regimes for part-timers and women. In addition, the relation between skills and earnings for the self-
employed is quite different from that for employees. Full-time is defined as working 32 hours or more per 
week. We only selected respondents for whom we had valid information on skill proficiency, skill use, and 
hourly wages. Wages were trimmed per country, omitting the first and 99th percentiles of the respondents 
in each country. 
 
The resulting data set includes 22 countries and 32,420 individuals. To avoid outliers in the distribution of 
skill proficiency per country-specific two-digit ISCO occupation category, we remove the first and 99th 
percentiles of the respondents in each occupation category per country. This leaves us with a working 
sample of 29,550 individuals. We use a multilevel model to account for the nested structure, allowing for 
error clustering at the country level. We estimate the following model: 
 
Wic = αc + β1Sic * Uic + β2Cic + υic + ωc 
      = αc + β1SEic + β2Cic + υic + ωc      (4) 
 
where, for individual i in country c, Wic is the natural logarithm of the hourly wages,
10
 αc is a country-
specific constant, Sic is the skill proficiency level, Uic is the corresponding skill use, SEic is the skill effort 
measure of eq. (1), Cic is a vector of control variables (with only the two variables age and age squared), 
and υic and ωc are idiosyncratic error terms at the individual and country levels, respectively. We start the 
analyses with the numeracy proficiency level and the level of use of numeracy skills and later check 
whether similar results are obtained for literacy. 
 
First we check the skill effort model with alternative specifications to check the validity of our assumption 
that productivity is a multiplicative function of skill and effort (proxied by skill use). We compare eq. (4) 
with a model in which we include the skill proficiency level and skill use level as separate effects, as well 
as a model in which we include both main effects and the interaction effect: 
 
Wic = αc + β1Sic + β2Uic + β3Cic + υic + ωc     (5) 
                                               
9 This was done for computational reasons. For the point estimates, this should not be a problem, but using the average 
of the 10 PVs can lead to underestimation of the standard errors. As a robustness check, we checked the results for 
several separate PVs to see whether they produce the same results. This is indeed the case (see Table B2 in Appendix 
B). Detailed results are available upon request. 
10 The hourly wages are all adjusted for cross-national differences by a purchasing power parity conversion. 
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Wic = αc + β1Sic + β2Uic + β3Sic * Uic + β4Cic + υic + ωc    (6) 
 
If only the main effects in eq. (6) are significant, then the assumption that productivity is a multiplicative 
function of skill and effort must be rejected. If only the interaction term is significant, then our assumption 
is fully supported. When both main effects and the interaction effect are significant, we can conclude that 
the assumption is partly supported. One reason for this could be that the variable Sic (numeracy in this case) 
is also correlated with other cognitive skills (e.g., general cognitive ability), so that any remaining effect of 
Sic could reflect these other skills. This could also hold for Uic. 
 
Next we perform quantile regression analysis to check whether the effect of skill use is the same over the 
entire skill proficiency distribution and vice versa. Finally, we repeat the analyses for the literacy domain to 
see if we obtain the same results. 
 
From eq. (5), we also derive information on whether or not both components Sic and Uic should have equal 
weights when calculating the skill effort measure. Remember that we started by standardizing both 
variables with a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of one, thus giving both components the same weight 
in the product term. However, if eq. (5) shows that the parameters β1 and β2 are different, we can adjust 
these weights to properly reflect the contribution of each component in the skill effort measure. 
 
We next estimate the full model of skill effort match variables, using the three variables in eq. (3): 
 
Wic = αc + β1SEMic + β2Cic + υic + ωc      (7) 
 
where SEMic is a vector of the three skill effort match variables RSEic, OSEic, and USEic from eq. (3). As a 
robustness check, we also estimate eq. (7) using the percentile rank in the country-specific wage 
distribution as a dependent variable. This is to check whether, in certain countries with a compressed wage 
distribution, the explained variance is better if we use the rank score rather than the logarithm of wages. 
 
We conduct further robustness checks in Section 5 by splitting up the analysis for young, prime age, and 
older workers. 
 
In the next model, we test whether the effects of the numeracy skill effort match variables are affected by 
skill effort match variables in other domains. First we test eq. (7) separately for the literacy domain and 
then add both domains in the model: 
 
Wic = αc + β1SEMLic + β2SEMNic + β3Cic + υic + ωc    (8) 
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where the subscripts N and L denote the numeracy and literacy domains, respectively. By comparing the 
results for literacy and numeracy from eq. (7) with those from eq. (8), we can see whether the parameter 
estimates are affected by including other skill domains. If the parameters of both models are substantially 
different, this implies that the parameters found in eq. (7) may be over- or underestimated. 
 
Next, we include the coverage rate as an explanatory variable at the country level to see whether this 
explains cross-country variation in the effect of the skill effort match variables. The coverage rate is 
defined
11
 as the number of employees covered by a collective agreement, divided by the total number of 
wage and salary earners in a country, based on OECD (2012b) data. The variable has a range of 13.6 to 
99.
12
 We calculate cross-level interactions with the vector SEMic as in the following model: 
 
Wic = αc + β1SEMic + β2CRc + β3 CRc * SEMic + β4Cic + υic + ωc   (9) 
 
where CRc is the country-specific coverage rate. We expect a general positive effect of CRc at the country 
level: A large proportion of workers falling under a collective wage agreement will increase the general 
wage level. On the other hand, we expect the interaction effects of CRc to have a depressing effect on the 
skill effort match variables SEMic. In other words, in countries where many workers fall under a collective 
wage agreement, wages are less affected by individuals’ matching variables with respect to skill effort. 
 
We also test a model in which we look at the effect of working in the public sector and its interaction 
effects on the skill effort match variables: 
 
Wic = αc + β1SEMic + β2PSic + β3 PSic * SEMic + β4Cic + υic + ωc   (10) 
 
where PSic is a dummy indicating whether an individual is working in the public sector (PS). 
 
Finally, we compare the new model with alternative models, as suggested by Allen et al. (2013), Pellizari 
and Fichen (2013), and a standard ORU model. The following alternative models are estimated: 
 
Wic = αc + β1Sic + β2Uic + β3OUic + β4UUic + β5Cic + υic + ωc   (11) 
 
where OUic and UUic are dummies denoting the overuse (OU) or underuse (UU) of skills according to 
Allen et al. (2013). Similarly, we estimate: 
                                               
11 See https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3554. 
12 We also checked an alternative measure using the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) from the OECD (2012c; 
see http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp). These results are not substantively different. However, we prefer the 
coverage rate to be the most theoretically relevant one.  
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Wic = αc + β1Sic + β2Uic + β3OSic + β4USic + β5Cic + υic + ωc   (12) 
 
where OSic and USic are dummies denoting being overskilled (OS) or underskilled (US) according to 
Pellizari and Fichen (2013). 
 
The alternative ORU model is the standard Duncan–Hoffman (1981) model in which we look at 
educational mismatches instead of skill mismatches: 
 
Wic = αc + β1REic + β2OEic + β3UEic + β4Cic + υic + ωc    (13) 
 
where REic denotes years of required education in occupation j in country c,
13
 OEic denotes years of 
overeducation (defined as own schooling OSi minus REic if OSi > REic and zero otherwise), and UEic 
denotes years of undereducation (defined as REic - OSi if OSi < REic and zero otherwise). Since education 
produces more skills than just numeracy (or literacy), we expect this ORU model to be better than the 
model in which we include only the skill effort match variables with respect to numeracy. 
 
5. Results 
 
First, we compare the skill effort model with alternative specifications to check the validity of the first 
assumption, namely, that productivity is a multiplicative function of skill and effort (proxied by skill use). 
We compare eq. (4) with a model in which we include the skill proficiency level and skill use level as 
separate effects (eq. (5)), as well as a model in which we include both the main effects and the interaction 
effect (eq. (6)). The results are displayed in Table 1. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
When only the main effects are entered in the model (eq. (5)), both numeracy proficiency and the use of 
numeracy skills show a positive significant effect on wages. A one standard deviation increase in numeracy 
skills raises wages by 13.2% and a similar increase in the use of numeracy skills raises wages by 9.3%. 
This model (Model 1) explains 12.6% of the between-country variation (= (0.119 - 0.104)/0.119*100) and 
28.9% of the within-country variation. However, with the inclusion of the interaction effect in eq. (6) 
(Model 2), these main effects are no longer significant and only the interaction effect is significant whereas 
the residual variation stays the same. Including only the interaction term as in eq. (4) (Model 3) hardly 
changes these parameters. This is very strong support for our assumption that states that productivity is a 
                                               
13 We use Allen and Bijlsma’s (2013) method to calculate the country-specific estimates of the required years of 
schooling per two-digit ISCO occupation category. 
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multiplicative function of skill and effort. Numeracy skills have no effect on wages other than through 
using these skills and, vice versa, the use of numeracy skills only affects wages in combination with some 
degree of proficiency. 
 
As indicated, the parameters in eq. (5) (Model 1) show that numeracy proficiency affects wages more than 
using these skills does. The difference in effect size is about 1.5 to one. This result suggests that we need to 
readjust the weights of these components in the skill effort measure such that they correspond to this 
difference. This is done by setting the standard deviation of the skill proficiency variable to 1.5 instead of 
1.0. The last column of Table 1 presents the results of eq. (4) using these adjusted weights. The results 
(Model 4) show that an increase of one standard deviation in numeracy skill effort yields a wage premium 
of 11.5% (= 0.918*1.25*10). 
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Figure 1 shows the results of a robustness check using quantile regression analysis to assess whether the 
effect of skill use is the same over the entire skill proficiency distribution and vice versa.
14
 The results show 
that this is indeed the case: We see a plane surface with hardly any deviations. 
 
In Table B1 of Appendix B we present the results of a robustness analysis using literacy scores instead of 
numeracy. We see that the main effects of skill proficiency and skill use become negative once the 
interaction term is introduced in Model 2 (eq. (6)). This can indicate multicollinearity of the three terms or 
some strange combination of low skill proficiency with high skill use or vice versa. More important is that 
the model with only the interaction term (Model 3) explains as much of the original variation as the model 
with only main effects (Model 1). We take this result as indicating that the concept of skill effort is robust 
over different domains. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
In Table 2, we present the results for skill effort matching as outlined in eq. (7), using the adjusted 
weights.
15
 As expected, we find required skill effort has a strong positive effect on wages. A one standard 
deviation increase in the required numeracy effort is associated with an increase of approximately 14% (= 
                                               
14 Complete results are available upon request.  
15 We also checked alternative specifications of the skill effort match variables, distinguishing between the different 
underlying components (skill proficiency and skill use). The main results are qualitatively the same and are available upon 
request. Table B2 shows the results if we use separate PVs instead of the average of the PVs. The results are 
substantially the same. Table B3 shows the results if we use a one standard deviation difference instead of 0.5 standard 
deviations to distinguish over- and underperformance in skill effort from the results for well-matched workers. The results 
are not significantly different. Given the fact that a 0.5 standard deviation difference within an occupation is quite large, we 
stick to the cutoff point of a difference of 0.5 standard deviations. Table B4 compares the skill effort matching model using 
the logarithm of wages with a model that uses the percentile rank in the country’s wage distribution. The latter model does 
considerably worse if we compare the residual variance of the intercept model with the actual models.  
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1.129*1.25*10) in wages. Given the different weights for skill proficiency and skill use in determining skill 
effort, this wage increase is 60% driven by the skill proficiency component and 40% by the skill use 
component in the skill effort measure. Overperformance in skill effort is also positively rewarded, but not 
as much. Expending one standard deviation more skill effort on the job than is required yields a premium of 
6.5%, which is still considerable but less than the premium on required skill effort. As expected, 
underperformance in skill effort is penalized. Expending one standard deviation less skill effort on the job 
than is typically required is associated with a wage penalty of 7.3%. This is just a little more, in absolute 
terms, as the positive effect of expending more skill effort on the job than is typically required. 
 
If we compare these results with what is usually found in the educational mismatch literature, we see a 
strong similarity. The returns to required skill proficiency levels are greater than the returns to 
overperformance or underperformance in skill effort. However, contrary to the literature, we do not find 
that the wage penalty for the underperfomance of skill effort is less in absolute terms than the wage 
premium for the overperformance of skill effort. Instead, we find that the effect is more or less the same. 
This finding could be explained by the fact the results usually found for undereducation are obscured as the 
group of undereducated is selective and compensates for undereducation with skills acquired through 
experience. If we look at the skill effort as presented here, we observe a more linear relation between skill 
effort and productivity, with an additional premium for workers who perform at a matching skill effort 
level. 
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
Figure 2 shows the explained variance of this model for the different countries plotted against the 
corresponding country’s coverage rate. We note that the explained variance at the individual level differs 
quite markedly across countries, ranging from about 20% in the Slovak Republic and Estonia to 
approximately 50% in the Netherlands and Austria, but there is no systematic relation with the coverage 
rate. We note that some countries that rank fairly high are typically regarded as occupational labor markets 
(Gangl, 2001), such as Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, but others are typical flexible and internal 
labor markets, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. The countries that show the weakest 
relation between the skill effort match variables and wages are typical Eastern European transition 
economies and some Southern European countries, such as Italy and Spain. In Canada, wages are also 
much less strongly related to the skill effort match variables. 
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
These results hardly change when we look at the percentile rank in the country’s wage distribution, which 
might work better for countries with a compressed wage distribution. Figure 3 shows the results comparing 
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the explained variances for each model (the full results are displayed in Table B4 of Appendix B). It shows 
that using the percentile rank in the country’s wage distribution does not improve the model at all. All 
countries are well above the diagonal, although, for some countries, the difference is not great. The only 
country for which we see no difference is the Slovak Republic. 
 
<Figure 4 about here> 
 
In Figure 4, we compare the cross-national variation in the explained variance for the skill effort matching 
model with the explained variance that we obtain from a simple ORU model. The two are highly correlated, 
meaning that most countries are close to the diagonal. This finding indicates that the low explained 
variance in the Eastern European countries is not driven only by a weak relation between skills and wages, 
but by a weak relation between schooling and wages as well. We interpret this finding to mean that, in 
well-functioning labor markets—whether typical occupational labor market types, such as the “Rheinland 
countries,” or whether very open and flexible, such as the Anglo-Saxon countries—wages are primarily 
driven by skills and the use of these skills as expressed in our skill effort measure. 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
In Table 3, we run the model for different age groups (16–34 years, 35–49 years, 50–65 years). The results 
indicate that the parameters are strongest for prime age workers (35–49 years) and older workers (50–65 
years). For younger workers (16–34 years), all the estimates for required skill effort, as well as 
overperformance and underperformance in skill effort, are considerably lower. This result is consistent with 
previous work by Altonji and Pierret (2001), who showed that the wages of young workers are more 
affected by schooling variables, while the wages of prime age and older workers are more affected by 
actual skills. We generally see few differences between prime age and older workers, at least when we look 
at the rewards for overperformance or the penalties for underperformance, and these differences are not 
statistically significant. However, older workers do obtain a significantly higher wage premium for 
typically required skill effort compared to prime age workers (1.379 compared to 1.248). 
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
Table 4 compares the skill effort matching model for numeracy with a similar model for literacy, both 
separately and together. For comparison, column (1) repeats the estimates for the numeracy domain, as 
presented earlier in Table 2. Column (2) shows the estimates for the literacy domain separately. These 
follow the same pattern as the numeracy items, but always with slightly higher values, especially the 
rewards and penalties for over- and underperformance. The return to typically required literacy effort is 
1.232, compared to 1.129 for numeracy, corresponding to an approximately 9% difference. The difference 
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in the returns to overperformance in literacy effort is greater (0.883 vs. 0.521), an approximately 70% 
difference. The same also holds for underperformance in literacy effort. However, in a joint model (eq. (8), 
column (3)), the numeracy items clearly outweigh the literacy-related items, thus confirming previous 
results showing numeracy having a stronger effect on wages compared to literacy (Levels et al., 2014). The 
magnitudes of the effects are reduced by about 70–80% for the literacy items and only about 10–25% for 
the numeracy items. In the joint model, the effect of required literacy effort is almost half that of required 
numeracy effort: A one standard deviation increase in required literacy effort yields a wage premium of 
5.0%, whereas a similar increase in required numeracy effort yields a wage premium of 10.3%. Similarly, 
overperformance in literacy effort by one standard deviation yields a wage premium of 2.3%, compared to 
5.8% in the case of numeracy effort. Conversely, underperformance of literacy effort by one standard 
deviation yields a wage penalty of 2.3%, compared to 6.0% in the case of numeracy effort. We conclude 
that the effects of skill effort in the different domains are not simply additive: The skill effort in both 
numeracy and literacy overlaps, which leads to an overestimation of the effects of one skill domain if the 
other is not included as well. This result holds more strongly for the literacy domain than for the numeracy 
domain. We will take this into account when looking at the results of the following analyses, which focus 
on numeracy again. 
 
Next, we continue with the numeracy skill effort matching model and include the country’s coverage rate 
as well as interaction terms with the skill effort match parameters (eq. (9)).
16
 The coverage rate is only 
available for 19 of the 22 countries. The results are presented in Table 5. 
 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
The analysis shows some interesting results. First, we see that the coverage rate in itself has no significant 
effect. However, the coverage rate has a strong general positive effect once we include the cross-level 
interaction effects with the skill effort match variables. That is, a strong coverage rate increases overall 
wages when controlling for the skill effort match variables and the interactions with coverage rate. A 10% 
increase in the coverage rate increases wages in a country by about 8.2%. However, this effect is offset by 
the negative interaction of the coverage rate with the skill effort match variables. The skill effort match 
variables show the effects of required skill effort and the over- and underperformance of skill effort in a 
situation when the coverage rate is zero. If we compare these results with the parameters of the skill effort 
matching model without the interaction effects with the coverage rate in these countries (column (2)), we 
see that all the parameters for the skill effort match variables are much larger for countries where the 
coverage rate is zero. For example, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in required skill effort in 
a country with a coverage rate of zero is 18.2%, but this effect decreases by 0.6% for every 1% increase in 
the coverage rate, becoming a negative effect for countries with a coverage rate of 30% or more. We see 
                                               
16 An alternative model using the EPL is presented in Table B5 in Appendix B. The results are quite similar to those 
shown here, although the explained variance is a bit lower. For theoretical reasons, we prefer the coverage rate.  
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similar depressing effects of the coverage rate on the returns to overperformance in skill effort (b = -0.003) 
and a decreasing penalty for underperformance (b = 0.004). 
 
 
<Figure 5 about here> 
 
This result is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows the different returns to required skill effort by coverage 
rate. We see a clear negative relation between the strength of the effect of required skill effort and the 
coverage rate, ranging from about 1.6 in the United States to about 0.8 in Sweden. 
 
<Table 6 about here> 
 
In Table 6, we look at the effect of working in the public sector. Column (1) presents the results of the main 
effects model, including a dummy for working in the public sector in the skill effort matching model. The 
general wage penalty for working in the public sector is 11.0%. However, it is clear that this penalty is not 
evenly distributed across the entire skill effort range. Column (2) provides the results of eq. (10), where 
interaction effects are added to the model. The general wage penalty for working in the public sector is now 
not significantly different from zero (-0.832). This means that workers in the public sector with zero skill 
effort obtain the same wages as similar workers in the private sector. However, the interaction effect with 
required skill effort is negative (b = -0.106). This means that, for workers in an occupation where the 
typical required skill effort is average (10*10 = 100), the wage penalty is 2.2%. We can also see that 
working in the public sector depresses the positive effect of overperformance (-0.040) and the negative 
effect of underperformance (+0.062). Interestingly the effect of the latter is somewhat larger in absolute 
terms than the effect of the former: The penalties for underperformance in the public sector are less severe 
than similar punishments in the private sector. 
 
<Table 7 about here> 
 
Finally, in Table 7, we show the results of our skill effort matching model and compare it with some other 
models. Column (1) shows the same parameters as in Table 2. Column (2) presents the results of the 
method of Allen et al. (2013), with the numeracy proficiency level, the skill use level, and dummies for the 
relative overutilization or underutilization of skills compared to skill proficiency levels. To compare the 
results, skill proficiency and skill use have the same scale as in the previous models (with a mean of 10 and 
standard deviations of 1.5 and 1.0, respectively). The results show the expected positive effects for skill 
proficiency and skill use. One standard deviation of extra skills yields a wage premium of 12.9% (= 
8.58*1.5) and one standard deviation of more use yields a wage premium of 9.8%. The effect of the relative 
overuse of skills compared to the skill level is not significant; however, being overskilled relative to the use 
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of skills (which is the same as the underuse of skills) has a significant positive effect. Note that the 
reference here is skill use on the job, which turns the parameter into a positive effect (like the effect of 
overeducation in the ORU model). Being overskilled compared to the use of skills pays off with a premium 
of about 3.2%. Nevertheless, the model of Allen et al. (2013) performs less well than the previously 
introduced skill effort matching model. The percentage of explained variance of the model compared to 
that of the intercept model is much lower than for the skill effort matching model (22.6% vs. 28.8%). 
Column (3) shows similar results for the Pellizari–Fichen (2013) model. The return for a one standard 
deviation increase in skill proficiency is 15.7% and a similar increase in the use of numeracy skills incurs a 
wage return of 8.7%. The penalty for being overskilled is 8.6%
17
 and the wage premium for being 
underskilled is 10.7%. Although these effects are all significant, the explained variance of the model is 
again lower than that of the skill effort matching model (22.9% vs. 28.8%). Finally, in column (4), we 
compare the skill effort matching model with a standard ORU model. To make the results more comparable 
to those of the skill effort matching model, we used the average years of schooling in an occupation as the 
proxy for required education (using the same algorithm as Allen and Bijlsma, 2015). The results show the 
familiar outcomes of an approximately 9.8% increase in wages for each additional year of schooling, a 
3.1% increase in wages for each year of overschooling, and a similar wage penalty for each year of 
underschooling. Since education imparts more skills than just numeracy, we expected this model to do 
better than the skill effort matching model. This is indeed the case, but the difference is remarkably small: 
31.0% versus 28.8%. This is again strong support for the skill effort matching model, showing that wages 
are driven by a multiplicative function of skill proficiency and skill use. 
 
6. Problem of within-occupation heterogeneity 
 
As shown above, our approach of skill effort and associated mismatch indicators is superior to other 
approaches of measuring mismatches (Allen et al. 2013; Pellizari and Fichen, 2013) in terms of explaining 
wages. Moreover, the concept is theoretically more advanced and well rooted in other theoretical 
approaches. However, still, we are basically using an RM approach to assess the effect of skills 
mismatches, which implies that we are neglecting heterogeneity within occupational categories. Our RM 
approach uses the mean skill proficiency and skill use level in an occupation as an indicator of the typically 
required skill effort in that occupation. If occupational groups are very heterogeneous, this could lead to the 
incorrect assignment of workers as being matched or mismatched. In the previous analyses, we used 
country-specific estimates of the required skill effort in each two-digit ISCO occupation category. If we 
could use a more refined classification, such as a three- or even four-digit ISCO level, this could reduce the 
problem of within-occupation heterogeneity. Allen and Bijlsma’s (2015) method of obtaining robust 
                                               
17 Remember that the reference here is the well-matched worker and not the required skill level, hence the reversal of 
signs. 
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estimates using a multilevel model already stretches the possibilities of the current PIAAC data set to the 
limit and cannot be used to obtain estimates at the three- or four-digit level.  
 
A very promising possibility is to use so-called small area estimation (SAE) models to arrive at more 
detailed estimates. The basic idea is to use other data sets in combination with the PIAAC data to obtain a 
more precise and reliable indicator of the required skill effort in detailed occupations. This method has been 
successfully used by Bijlsma, van den Brakel, van der Velden, and Allen (2017) to estimate literacy 
proficiency levels at a very detailed regional level (over 200 municipalities in the Netherlands). In this 
paper, we do the same to arrive at average skill effort levels at the one-, two-, and three-digit ISCO levels. 
For this, we use the Dutch Labour Force Survey (LFS) data and PIAAC data. The basic idea of SAE is to 
develop a prediction model on a smaller data set (PIAAC in this case) and use a larger data set (LFS in this 
case) with the same predictors to obtain a synthetic estimate of the dependent variable in each one-, two-, 
or three-digit ISCO occupation category. The outcome is a weighted sum of direct estimates (from PIAAC) 
and synthetic estimates where the weight is based on the precision of each of the two estimates. Appendix 
C describes the model we use. The results in Appendix C show that the standard errors can be considerably 
reduced by using SAE models instead of direct estimates, especially when there are fewer than 100 to 150 
cases in an occupation. This is a first indication that the estimates of the average skill proficiency levels that 
we use for the two-digit ISCO occupation categories in each country are likely to be unstable in the case of 
low numbers of respondents. The robust estimators of Allen and Bijlsma (2013) provide more stable 
estimates but do not address the problem of within-two-digit-occupation heterogeneity. This heterogeneity 
is due to the fact that each two-digit ISCO occupation category is made up of different three-digit ISCO 
occupation categories. We can simulate the effect of aggregation by using SAE models to assess the 
average numeracy skill effort level at the one-, two-, and three-digit ISCO levels, respectively. Table 8 
provides the results. 
 
<Table 8 about here> 
 
The results in Table 8 indicate that the effect of required skill effort increases significantly when a more 
refined classification is used. The effect of required skill effort almost doubles in magnitude when moving 
from the one-digit model to the three-digit model (from 1.393 to 2.237). In addition, using the three-digit 
ISCO level as a basis instead of the two-digit ISCO level (as in the current analysis) significantly increases 
the effect of required skill effort, from 1.943 to 2.237, an increase of about 15%. Put differently, if one uses 
broad occupational categories, such as one- or two-digit ISCO occupation categories, one will 
underestimate the effect of the required skill effort and overestimate the relative effect of performing better 
or worse than is typically required. There is no indication that the increase in the effects of required skill 
effort tapers off when moving from the two- to the three-digit model. This result suggests that even more 
precise estimates can be obtained when using an even more refined classification, such as a four-digit (or 
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even more refined) classification. This means that the effects of required skill effort are likely to be 
underestimated in all RM models, while the effects of individual overperformance or underperformance in 
skill effort are likely to be overestimated in these models. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
There is convincing evidence that the wage effects of education are largely driven by skills (Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2011; Hanushek et al., 2015), although the effects are weaker in less institutionalized settings 
(Levels et al., 2014) and the mechanism through which skills affect wages is largely left unexplained. There 
is also strong evidence of different returns in the case of educational mismatches (Hartog, 2000; Groot and 
Maassen van den Brink, 2000). Generally, workers gain more rewards for years of required education than 
for years of overeducation, while the penalties for years of undereducation are the least severe. 
 
The research on skill mismatches has produced more mixed results than the research on educational 
mismatches. This is partly due to the fact that educational and skill mismatches are not the same, due to 
heterogeneity in skills within educational levels and the sorting of the least skilled graduates from each 
level to less complex jobs (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; Green and McIntosh, 2007). However, part of 
the problem is also the lack of good measures for skill requirements. Three approaches have been 
developed to proxy for these skill requirements: WS (asking the worker about the required level), RM 
(taking the average or median skill level in an occupation as the required skill level), and the JRA (taking 
the use of skills in a job as a proxy for the required skill level). 
 
We discussed the pros and cons of each of these approaches and concluded that each has its own 
weaknesses, both theoretically and empirically. Elaborating on this point, we discussed the different views 
one can have on skill use. On the one hand, one can view the use of skills as a proxy for skill requirement, 
as in the JRA, or one can consider the use of skill as complementary to skill proficiency. This latter 
approach is closer to the view of the use of skills in the engagement literature, where using skills is an 
essential component of the literacy and numeracy constructs (OECD, 2012a). The link between skill 
proficiency and skill use is also firmly rooted in use-it-or-lose-it theories (Salthouse, 2006) and self-
efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977). 
 
In this paper, we developed this idea further by explicitly linking skill use and skill proficiency into a new 
concept, skill effort. Skill effort is defined as a multiplicative function of skill proficiency and skill use and 
has an intuitively appealing notion. A worker’s skill proficiency can have no productivity effect if the 
worker’s skills are not being used and, vice versa, the productive use of skills is moderated by the worker’s 
skill proficiency level. The idea of using a multiplicative function to combine skill proficiency and skill use 
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has its parallel in the performance literature on ability and motivation (Vroom, 1964), where performance is 
viewed as the result of a multiplicative function of ability and motivation. 
 
Our results showed that the new model developed is indeed much better than the original models of skill 
proficiency and skill use as separate predictors of wages. In a joint model, the multiplicative term 
supersedes the effect of all the separate terms, a strong indication of the basic notion of our skill effort 
model, namely, that there can be no productivity effect of skill proficiency when the skills are not being 
used and vice versa. 
 
We next developed a skill effort matching model similar to the ORU model (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981) 
for educational mismatches. The model distinguishes three components, one for the returns to required skill 
effort, one for the returns to overperformance in skill effort, and one for the returns to underperformance. 
The results show that one standard deviation increase in required skill effort is associated with a wage 
premium of about 14%. Investing more skill effort in a job than typically required also yields a premium, 
but not as big, at 6.5%, and investing less skill effort in a job than is typically required yields a wage 
penalty of 7.3%. 
 
As indicated earlier, we have to be cautious when interpreting these results. These effects are all estimated 
without including the skill effort match variables of other domains. In an additional analysis, we showed 
that the above-mentioned effects all decrease by about 10–25% if we include the skill effort match 
variables of literacy. This means that the effect sizes mentioned above should be regarded as an upper 
bound of the effect of numeracy skill effort and the skill effort mismatch variables. On the other hand, the 
estimates of the required skill effort can also be seen as a lower bound, since the results from the SAE 
models show that using a more refined classification of occupations (e.g., three-digit ISCO level instead of 
two-digit ISCO level) yields far higher estimates for the required skill effort. These estimates are about 
15% higher and, again, could be higher still if one uses an even more refined classification. We return to 
this issue below but, for the moment, we conclude that the estimates for required skill effort will probably 
not be that different if we include other domains as well as a more refined classification. 
 
The results can best be explained with matching theory. The premium for required skill effort is larger than 
the premium for expending more skill effort than is typically required on the job, which is in line with 
typical findings from the educational mismatch literature. When we look at the wage penalties for 
expending less skill effort than is typically required, we find that this penalty is about as high in absolute 
terms as the premium for expending more skill effort. In the education mismatch research, the effect of 
undereducation is usually found to be lower. This result can be explained by the fact that this effect of 
undereducation is probably underestimated due to selection effects: People who end up in a job for which 
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they are formally undereducated probably have other skills (through experience) that compensate for this 
lack of required schooling. This is less the case when we look at skill effort, as we do here. 
 
We conducted additional analyses, looking at differences between age groups. The results indicate that, 
consistent with the results of Altonji and Pierret (2001), the model works best for prime age and older 
workers. For younger workers, the effects of the skill effort match variables are considerably weaker. 
Interestingly, we see that older workers obtain an even higher premium for required skill effort than prime 
age workers do. 
 
We also included the coverage rate of a country in the model and an interaction of this variable with the 
skill effort match variables. We found the skill effort match variables to have the strongest effects in 
countries with a low percentage of workers falling under a collective wage agreement, which is consistent 
with theories about labor market institutions (Marsden, 1999). This result is broadly in line with those of an 
alternative model in which we looked at the effect of working in the public sector and the interaction with 
the skill effort match variables. We showed that there is a wage penalty for working in the public sector but 
it is highest for workers in occupations with high skill effort requirements. 
 
Finally, we compared the skill effort matching model to other models looking at skill mismatches in the 
labor market, namely, those of Allen et al. (2013) and Pellizari and Fichen (2013) and a simple educational 
mismatch (ORU) model. The results show that the skill effort matching model is far superior to the 
alternative models that assess the effects of skill mismatches (Allen et al., 2013; Pellizari and Fichen, 2013) 
in terms of explained variances (29% for the skill effort matching model versus 23% for the other two 
models) and almost as good as a standard ORU model (31%). This finding is again strong support for the 
developed skill effort model. The predictive validity when we look at wage differences is far better than 
that of any alternative skill matching model. Since schooling variables reflect more skills than just 
numeracy or literacy, we had expected the ORU model to be better. The fact that the explained variance of 
our skill effort matching model is very close to that of this ORU model is therefore very encouraging. 
 
These results do not mean that this approach needs no further development. Although the basic idea of skill 
effort is empirically and theoretically sound, there is an inherent weak point when we turn this into a 
matching model. Our skill effort matching model is based on an RM approach, with the two problems 
associated with that approach. The first problem is that of heterogeneity within occupational groups. Our 
RM approach uses the average skill proficiency or skill use level in an occupation as an indicator of the 
required skill effort in that occupation. If occupational groups are very heterogeneous, this could lead to the 
erroneous assignment of workers as being matched or mismatched. We used SAE models to estimate the 
effect of the heterogeneity. The results show that using the one-digit ISCO occupation classification as 
Pellizari and Fichen (2013) is likely to result in strong underestimation of the effects of required skill effort. 
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Even using the two-digit ISCO classification, as in this paper, results in an underestimation of the effects of 
required skill effort, as the SAE models based on the three-digit classification show. Because of data 
limitations in the LFS, we cannot check whether this also holds for using the three-digit ISCO level, but it 
is likely that a more refined classification, such as the four-digit ISCO level, will reduce the problem of 
within-occupation heterogeneity even further. 
 
The second problem with using the RM approach is that of defining a good match. Basically, RM models 
take the average or median levels as indicating a match but, of course, this need not be the case. For 
example, the fact that 80% of workers in an occupation have a skill proficiency level that is not higher or 
lower than a half standard deviation difference from the mean does not automatically imply that all these 
workers are well matched. In fact, most workers in that occupation could have a skill proficiency level that 
is too high or too low for that occupation. There is no simple way to address this problem, since we lack 
direct information on skill requirements from employers. One way to solve this would be to obtain expert 
opinions on the required skill level in each three-digit ISCO occupation category. Basically, this would be 
equivalent to what has been called the job analyst method of identifying educational mismatches (Hartog, 
2000). This job analyst method is generally regarded as potentially the most reliable way to identify 
educational mismatches (Verhaest and Omey, 2006). The experts would need to express these required skill 
levels in the same scale metric as the possessed skills are measured in to directly compare the two. We 
advise the OECD to adopt an initiative to consult national job experts and international domain-specific 
experts (e.g., in numeracy, literacy, and problem solving), to provide estimates of the required skill levels 
for each three-digit ISCO occupation category for the countries currently participating in the PIAAC survey 
and its follow-ups. 
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Figure 1 Effect on hourly wage of increasing one quartile in numeracy skill or numeracy use 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Explained variance skill effort matching models per country plotted against the coverage rate 
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Figure 3 Explained variance log wage and percentile rank wage distribution per country 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Explained variance skill effort matching model and ORU model per country  
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Figure 5 Relation between coverage rate and wage effect of required skill effort 
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Table 1 Comparing different specifications of the skill effort model 
VARIABLES Model 1 
(Eq. (5)) 
Model 2 
(Eq. (6)) 
Model 3 
(Eq. (4)) 
Model 4 
(Eq. (4) with adj. 
weights) 
Skill Proficiency 13.168*** 
(0.267) 
1.622 
(2.412) 
  
Skill Use 9.285*** 
(0.248) 
-2.557 
(2.471) 
  
Proficiency * Use  1.173*** 
(0.244) 
1.114*** 
(0.014) 
0.918*** 
(0.011) 
Nindividuals 29047 29047 29047 29551 
Ncountries 22 22 22 22 
BIC 26575 26562 26635 27890 
 
Variance components Intercept model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Between Variance 0.119 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.103 
Within Variance 0.204 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.147 
Total Variance 0.323 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.250 
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2. 
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Table 2 Skill effort matching model (eq. (7)) 
VARIABLES  
Returns to required skill effort 
1.129*** 
 
(0.012) 
Returns to overperformance in skill effort 
0.521*** 
 
(0.022) 
Returns to underperformance in skill effort 
-0.584*** 
 
(0.022) 
Nindividuals 29552 
Ncountries 22 
BIC 25049 
 
 
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2. 
  
Variance components Intercept model Full Model  
Between Variance 0.119 0.094 
Within Variance 0.204 0.136 
Total Variance 0.323 0.230 
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Table 3 Skill effort matching model for different age groups 
VARIABLES Young age Prime age Old age 
 
      
Returns to required skill effort 0.777*** 1.248*** 1.379*** 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.024) 
Returns to overperformance in skill effort 0.371*** 0.574*** 0.561*** 
 
(0.032) (0.035) (0.054) 
Returns to underperformance in skill effort -0.429*** -0.715*** -0.681*** 
 
(0.037) (0.034) (0.041) 
Nindividuals 11022 11320 7110 
Ncountries 22 22 22 
BIC 8865 9233 6133 
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2. 
 
Young Age (16-34) 
Variance components Intercept model Model 
Between Variance 0.086 0.075 
Within Variance 0.180 0.128 
Total Variance 0.266 0.203 
 
Prime Age (35-49) 
Variance components Intercept model Model 
Between Variance 0.122 0.105 
Within Variance 0.182 0.128 
Total Variance 0.304 0.233 
 
Old Age (50-65) 
Variance components Intercept model Model 
Between Variance 0.153 0.134 
Within Variance 0.201 0.135 
Total Variance 0.354 0.269 
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Table 4 Skill effort matching model for literacy and numeracy  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES Numeracy only  
Literacy 
only Numeracy + Literacy 
Returns to required skill effort (literacy)  1.232*** 0.403** 
 
 (0.014) (0.039) 
Returns to overperformance in skill effort (literacy)  0.883*** 0.186*** 
 
 (0.051) (0.058) 
Returns to underperformance in skill effort (literacy)  -0.824*** -0.186*** 
  (0.039) (0.058) 
Returns to required skill effort (numeracy) 1.129***  0.826*** 
 
(0.012)  (0.031) 
Returns to overperformance in skill effort (numeracy) 0.521***  0.466*** 
 
(0.022)  (0.025) 
Returns to underperformance in skill effort (numeracy) -0.584***  -0.481*** 
 
(0.022)  (0.027) 
Nindividuals 29552 29545 29545 
Ncountries 22 22 22 
BIC 25049 25849 24945 
 
Variance components Intercept model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Between Variance 0.119 0.094 0.082 0.090 
Within Variance 0.204 0.136 0.139 0.135 
Total Variance 0.323 0.230 0.221 0.225 
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2. 
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Table 5 Skill effort matching model with coverage rate 
VARIABLES Only main effects  
Plus 
interaction 
effects 
  
 
Returns to required skill effort (a) 1.454*** 1.120*** 
 
(0.028) (0.012) 
Returns to overperformance in skill effort (b) 0.738*** 0.525*** 
 
(0.056) (0.024) 
Returns to underperformance in skill effort (c) -0.830*** -0.572*** 
 
(0.051) (0.022) 
Coverage Rate 0.822*** 0.271 
 
(0.235) (0.230) 
Coverage rate * a -0.005***  
 
(0.000)  
Coverage rate * b -0.003***  
 
(0.001)  
Coverage rate * c 0.004***  
 
(0.001)  
Nindividuals 25340 25340 
Ncountries 19 19 
BIC 20196 20340 
Variance components 
Intercept 
model 
Main effect model % 
explained 
Interaction effect  
model 
% 
explained 
Between Variance 0.119 0.085 28,6% 0.084 29.4% 
Within Variance 0.204 0.129 36,8% 0.130 36.3% 
Total Variance 0.323 0.214 33,7% 0.214 33.7% 
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2. 
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Table 6 Skill effort matching model with public sector 
VARIABLES Only main effects  
Plus 
interaction 
effects 
  
 
Returns to required skill effort (a) 1.107*** 1.430*** 
 
(0.012) (0.033) 
Returns to overperformance in skill effort (b) 0.513*** 0.642*** 
 
(0.023) (0.059) 
Returns to underperformance in skill effort (c) -0.544*** -0.734*** 
 
(0.022) (0.066) 
Public sector -11.026** -0.832 
 
(4.924) (5.074) 
Public sector * a  -0.106*** 
 
 (0.010) 
Public sector * b  -0.040** 
 
 (0.016) 
Public sector * c  0.062*** 
 
 (0.021) 
Nindividuals 25084 25084 
Ncountries 22 22 
BIC 18184 18100 
Variance components 
Intercept 
model 
Main effect model % 
explained 
Interaction effect  
model 
% 
explained 
Between Variance 0.119 0.055 53.8% 0.056 52.9% 
Within Variance 0.204 0.120 41.2% 0.119 41.7% 
Total Variance 0.323 0.175 45.8% 0.175 45.8% 
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2. 
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Table 7 Skill effort matching model compared with alternative models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES 
Skill effort 
model Allen et al. (2013)  
Pellizari and Fichen 
(2013)  
ORU model 
 
Returns to required skill effort  1.129***    
 (0.012)    
Returns to overperformance in skill effort  0.521***    
 (0.022)    
Returns to underperformance in skill effort  -0.584***    
 (0.022)    
Overskilled compared to Use  3.151***   
  (0.890)   
Overuse compared to Skill  -0.116   
  (0.969)   
Overskilled   -8.599*** 
 
 
  (0.745) 
 Underskilled   10.683*** 
 
 
  (0.993) 
 Skill Proficiency  8.580*** 10.451*** 
 
 
 (0.299) (0.198) 
 Skill Use  9.833*** 8.733*** 
 
 
 (0.342) (0.246) 
 Overeducation   
 
3.139*** 
 
 
  
(0.155) 
Required Education  
  
9.762*** 
 
 
  
(0.108) 
Undereducation  
  
-3.010*** 
 
 
  
(0.181) 
Nindividuals 29552 30144 29770 29842 
Ncountries 22 22 22 22 
BIC 25049 27931 27188 26335 
Variance components 
Intercept model Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
Between Variance 0.119 0.094 0.103 0.104 0.084 
Within Variance 0.204 0.136 0.147 0.145 0.139 
Total Variance 0.323 0.230 0.250 0.249 0.223 
% explained variance Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Between Variance 21,0% 13,4 12,6 29,4 
Within Variance 33,3% 27,9 28,9 31,9 
Total Variance 28,8% 22,6 22,9 31,0 
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2.  
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Table 8 Skill effort matching model for one-, two-, and three-digit ISCO levels (results for The Netherlands only) 
VARIABLES One-digit ISCO  Two-digit ISCO Three-digit ISCO 
Returns to required skill effort 1.393*** 1.943*** 2.237*** 
 
(0.054) (0.076) (0.102) 
Returns to overperformance in skill effort 0.897*** 0.831*** 0.777*** 
 
(0.119) (0.149) (0.121) 
Returns to underperformance in skill effort -1.249*** -1.292*** -1.283*** 
 
(0.149) (0.163) (0.130) 
Nindividuals 1286 1279 1315 
R-square 0.506 0.504 0.511 
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2. 
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Appendix A: Calculation of robust country-specific estimates at the two-digit ISCO 
level of skill proficiency and skill use 
 
A problem with the PIAAC data set is that it has only a limited number of observations available for each 
two-digit ISCO occupation category in a country. To avoid inaccuracies in the assessment of the average 
skill proficiency and skill use levels for these occupations, Allen and Bijlsma (2013) developed a cross-
classified multilevel model in which individuals are nested in both international two-digit ISCO occupation 
categories as well as in national one-digit ISCO occupation categories. The national averages for each two-
digit ISCO occupation category are thus a function of both the national data for the individual’s one-digit 
ISCO occupation category as well as the international data of the individual’s two-digit ISCO occupation 
category. To illustrate, the average numeracy level of Dutch building trade workers (ISCO 71) is estimated 
as a weighted average of the numeracy level of all Dutch craft workers (ISCO 7), the numeracy levels of 
building trade workers in other countries, as well as the directly observed numeracy level of Dutch building 
trade workers in the data. To avoid the problem where certain countries can have very different skill 
profiles and would thus give rise to a systematic bias, the contribution of other countries is weighted such 
that countries that are more similar to the reference country (the Netherlands in this case) also have higher 
weights. These weights are based on the between-country correlation between the preliminary two-digit 
occupational skill estimates of the reference country and all the other countries in the data. This correlation 
is squared and can thus be conceived of as the amount of variance in the reference country’s occupational 
skill structure that can be explained by the occupational skill structures of the other countries. By 
definition, the respondents in the reference country are assigned a weight of one and those in the other 
countries are assigned a weight between zero and one (usually around 0.7). The estimates were carried out 
for all two-digit occupation categories, with the exception of army occupations (ISCO 0). We use this 
method to obtain the country-specific estimates of the skill proficiency and skill use levels in each two-digit 
ISCO occupation category. An Excel spreadsheet with these estimates is available upon request. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1 Robustness check using literacy instead of numeracy 
VARIABLES Model 1 
(Eq. (5)) 
Model 2 
(Eq. (6)) 
Model 3 
(Eq. (4)) 
Model 4 
(Eq. (4) with adj. weights) 
Skill Proficiency 
12.233*** 
(0.259) 
-8.787*** 
(2.347) 
  
Skill Use 10.633*** 
(0.240) 
-10.214*** 
(2.326) 
  
Proficiency * Use 
 2.126*** 
(0.236) 
1.161*** 
(0.015) 
0.928*** 
(0.012) 
Nindividuals 29552 29552 29552 29552 
Ncountries 22 22 22 22 
BIC 27589 27518 27528 27569 
 
Variance components Intercept model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Between Variance 0.119 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 
Within Variance 0.204 0.148 0.147 0.148 0.148 
Total Variance 0.323 0.252 0.251 0.252 0.252 
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2. 
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Table B2 Skill effort matching model (eq. (8)) using separate PV’s 
VARIABLES PV1 
Full Model 
PV2 
Full model 
PV 4 
Full model 
PV 9 
Full model 
PV10 
Full Model 
Returns to required skill effort 1.103*** 1.101*** 1.102*** 1.105*** 1.107*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Returns to overperformance in skill 
effort 0.466*** 0.465*** 0.467*** 0.488*** 0.456*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
Returns to underperformance in 
skill effort -0.528*** -0.517*** -0.522*** -0.530*** -0.547*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Nindividuals 29552 29552 29552 29552 29552 
Ncountries 22 22 22 22 22 
 
 
  
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2. 
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Table B3 Robustness check comparing the skill effort matching model using different cut-off points 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES St.dev.= 0.5 St.dev.=1.0 
 
    
Returns to required skill effort 1.129*** 1.128*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Returns to overperformance in skill effort 0.521*** 0.531*** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Returns to underperformance in skill effort -0.584*** -0.593*** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Nindividuals 29552 29546 
Ncountries 22 22 
BIC 25049 26312 
Variance components Intercept model Model 1 Model 2 
Between Variance 0.152 0.093 0.094 
Within Variance 0.202 0.136 0.136 
Total Variance 0.354 0.229 0.228 
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2. 
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Table B4 Robustness check comparing the skill effort matching model using log wages or percentile rank in the wage 
distribution 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES Log wage Percentile rank 
 
    
Returns to required skill effort 1.129*** 0.663*** 
 
(0.012) (0.008) 
Returns to overperformance in skill effort 0.521*** 0.282*** 
 
(0.022) (0.014) 
Returns to underperformance in skill effort -0.584*** -0.286*** 
 
(0.022) (0.014) 
Nindividuals 29552 29552 
Ncountries 22 22 
BIC 25049 1344 
 
Variance components Intercept model Model 1 Intercept Model 2 
Between Variance 0.119 0.093 0.000 0.002 
Within Variance 0.204 0.136 0.083 0.061 
Total Variance 0.323 0.229 0.083 0.063 
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2. 
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Table B5 Skill effort matching model with EPL 
VARIABLES EPL  
  Returns to required skill effort (a) 1.465*** 
 
(0.037) 
Returns to overperformance in skill effort (b) 0.711*** 
 
(0.071) 
Returns to underperformance in skill effort (c) -0.866*** 
 
(0.071) 
EPL 5.324 
 
(10.057) 
EPL * a -0.167*** 
 
(0.017) 
EPL * b -0.087** 
 
(0.034) 
EPL * c 0.142*** 
 
(0.034) 
Nindividuals 28757 
Ncountries 21 
BIC 24363 
 
Variance components Intercept  EPL model % explained   
Between Variance 0.127 0.094 26.0%   
Within Variance 0.201 0.135 32.8%   
Total Variance 0.328 0.229 30.2%   
Parameters multiplied by 100; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controls include age, age2. 
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Appendix C: Development of the SAE model 
 
Direct estimates of the PIAAC data at the three-digit ISCO level will not produce reliable estimates, since 
the sample sizes per occupation will be too low in many cases. Therefore, we use model-based SAE 
techniques in a hierarchical Bayesian framework to develop reliable estimates at this level. We take the 
unit-level model used by Bijlsma et al. (2017) and adjust it for our purposes, using the occupation level 
instead of the municipality level and adding extra occupation-specific regressors. The following is a 
summarized explanation of our model framework. 
 
The basic idea of SAE is that we assume that our dependent variable (numeracy) is closely linked to 
personal characteristics found in both PIAAC and larger auxiliary data sets such as the LFS survey data and 
we use that data to obtain a synthetic estimate of hourly wages per occupation. The standard error of this 
estimate will be low, at the cost of introducing bias due to not taking into account the error term. We can 
then take a weighted average between the direct estimates from the PIAAC data and this synthetic estimate 
to arrive at more robust and reliable results while introducing only limited bias. A full explanation of the 
calculation of the weights and accounting for the PIAAC design structure is given by Bijlsma et al. (2017). 
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Figure C1 A normal Q–Q plot of the estimates on numeracy per occupation for one-digit ISCO level (upper left), two-
digit ISCO level (upper right) and three-digit ISCO level (bottom) 
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Figure C2 Comparison of standard errors of numeracy estimates within occupations for one-digit ISCO level (top), 
two-digit ISCO level (middle) and three-digit ISCO level (bottom) 
 
 
 
 
